Introduction
The current Army Physical Disability Evaluation System (PDES) is extremely complex given that is has developed and transformed over time to meet changing strategic assumptions and considerations. Multiple governing directives 1 contribute to a process that has become increasingly bureaucratic and slow. The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) spearheaded by Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) has engaged the military services in continuous combat operations since 2001. Not surprisingly, the number of Soldiers that have required processing through the PDES as a result of becoming wounded and injured has risen dramatically.
When aggregating those with the individuals who have developed illness requiring disability evaluation, over 80,000 Soldiers have traversed this system. 2 The PDES has become the number one source of dissatisfaction among the Wounded, Ill, and Injured (WII) population of Soldiers. 3 The key problem centers on regulations and statutes that support a dual rating system. This dual rating system creates an unnecessary adversarial relationship between the individual and the organization, as Soldiers must achieve an Army adjudicated level of disability at 30% to be eligible for continued pay and benefits. 4 The Army has attempted to make improvements to the PDES over the past year.
Efforts have been focused on decreasing confusion, eliminating bureaucracy, improving coordination, and increasing services to take care of Soldiers and their families. A demonstration pilot program that began in November 2007 has mitigated some of the complexity of the system by forging an improved and closer connection between all of 2 the military services within the Department of Defense (DoD) with the Department of Veteran Affairs (VA). The centerpiece of the demonstration pilot has been the single physical examination performed by the VA from which all disability determinations are made. Further, this facilitates a smoother civilian transition for Soldiers who are unable to continue their service in the Army. Nonetheless, the nexus of the problem, the dual rating system, remains essentially unchanged.
Soldiers deserve a disability system that is efficient and fair. It should focus on the rehabilitation their individual capabilities and promote maximal workforce reintegration. The challenge of the PDES as it exists is that it was not developed to support an Army that is engaged in persistent conflict. It is time to embark on complete reform of the PDES that is consistent with the current operational needs. The clear line of delineation should be such that:
 DoD determines fitness for duty and compensates for service.
 VA determines medical limitations and compensates for disability.
The military services should focus on fitness determination, providing the maximal medical treatment that encourages continued service. This will disengage the Army from the adjudication process that promotes conflict with Soldiers. Supporting legislative changes will be required that provide an equitable service-related compensation package that will assist impaired Soldiers through the transition process if they are found unfit. Disability determination by the VA follows a natural course given that the VA is the statutory agency that provides life-long medical care for disabled veterans. Additionally, there should be provisions that will guarantee continued 3 healthcare benefits for the families of disabled Soldiers. These combined changes will underscore the Nation's commitment to Soldiers and their families.
Historical Background
Historical precedent for providing disability compensation to war veterans dates to 1862 when Congress passed the "General Law System", establishing the Pension Bureau. 5 The limitations of medical treatment and rehabilitation served as the key justification for providing compensation. The General Law allowed for Union Army veterans to submit claims for war-related disabilities to receive remunerative compensation. 'Disability' was defined in relation to the performance of "severe and continuous" manual labor 6 and rated by locally retained physicians who completed standard "surgeon's certificates". 7 Compensation was based on a percentage proportion relative to the maximal amount provided for total disability. Multiple modifications and amendments occurred in the ensuing years leading to the Consolidation Act of 1873 which broadened the timeframe used to classify war-related injuries and added disease entities that were deemed "equivalent" to disability. 8 The 1879 Arrears Act allowed veterans to receive lump sum back payment for disability claims that could be substantiated as war-related regardless of when presented to the Pension Bureau. This led to a dramatic increase of claims by veterans who were increasingly important as a political constituency. 9 The Disability Pension Act of 1890 marked the shift from a disability compensation system based on war-related injury and impairment to one based on service length and age. 10 Further, it allowed for pension eligibility to be awarded for disabilities that that were not service-related. The Disability Pension Act of 1890 was one of the most liberal and costly pension measures ever passed. At its peak in the mid-1890s, veteran pensions accounted for 50% of the total federal budget. 11 In 1904, Executive Order No. 78 stipulated that old age itself was a 'disability' that would be covered by the Disability Pension Act of 1890 regardless of health condition. 12 In 1907, the Service and Age Pension Law replaced the 1890 Act granting pensions to veterans over the age 62 based on age and service length. 13 This laid the foundation for service retirement pensions, and de-emphasized the attention given to disability compensation.
The challenge of addressing war-related injury and disability re-emerged during World War I. A maximalist approach to provide medical care shaped policy.
Improvements of medical technology were sufficient such that the goal was to provide all necessary treatment and rehabilitation to 'cure' patients to the 'maximum extent'. 14 This was done so by the Army as no other governmental agency existed at the time to do so. The Army rapidly built a medical care system that provided 40,000 general hospital beds to accommodate injured veterans. 15 On behalf of the nation, the Army undertook the goal of rehabilitating disabled veterans to be "wage earners independent of charity". 16 From a governmental perspective, this was expected to help avoid the burden of the extreme expense that had been incurred providing pensions to disabled Civil War veterans. Subsequent to World War I in 1921, the Veterans' Bureau (later Veterans' Administration) was created to provide for the medical care of World War I veterans. Over the following 20 years, the VA gradually grew to become the largest medical system in the United States caring for an aging population of veterans irrespective of disability. 17 This allowed the Army to streamline operations and refocus 5 on providing medical health care for a relatively young and healthy population without disability.
World War II added the dimension of volume that challenged both the Army as well as the VA in terms of caring for and treating the injured. Both medical systems needed to grow rapidly just to accommodate the increasing numbers of patients, while expanding medical capabilities to address rehabilitation of the disabled. From the Army perspective, providing the 'maximum benefit' of medical services to the injured was emphasized with the goal of conserving the fighting strength. 18 It became the Army responsibility to determine fitness for service, and thus, disability as well. This was fostered by significant advances in medical techniques and practices. Simultaneously, there was resistance to transfer patients to the VA due to lack of services and poor quality of care. Public attention mounted with media outlets highlighting that the VA provided, 'third-rate medicine to first-rate men'. 19 Further, the VA had developed a reputation for 'institutionalizing' veterans rather than providing adequate rehabilitative treatment. 20 Public pressure was sufficient such that President Truman moved to modernize the VA immediately after the war and appointed GEN Omar Bradley as its Administrator. While the organization underwent transformation promoting expanded services and improved quality, the demarcation line for the responsibility of caring for the injured, and by default assigning disability, remained blurry.
During the post-war years, the VA continued to grow while the Army began to drawdown. The differing cultures of the two organizations with respect to treating the injured facilitated a continued reluctance by the Army to transfer patients to the VA despite significant improvement of the VA medical system. The Career Compensation 6 Act of 1949 carried a provision for the creation of the Temporary Disability Retirement List (TDRL) which extended the period of retention for medical treatment to five years. 21 The intent of providing the additional time was to reach full rehabilitation such that Soldiers could be retained in the service rather than medically retired for disability. The onset of the Korean War in 1950 prompted President Truman to issue Executive Order 10122 which directed that chronic patients and those judged not likely to return to duty were the responsibility of the VA. 22 Two years passed before the Army published Army Regulation 40-680 (Length of Hospitalization and Disposition of Patients) which provided the guidelines for disability separation for those that were considered permanently medically unfit for service. The process that evolved with the consideration by a Medical Board and Physical Evaluation Board still provided ample time for the Army to retain otherwise disabled Soldiers. The increasing complexity of medical treatment available increased the time it could take to reach 'optimal' improvement, such that 'maximal hospital benefit' was left to wide interpretation. 23 Although the regulation seemed clear and firm, disposition practices did not change. The essential outcome was that the Army had greater leeway to retain disabled patients.
The Dependents Medical Care Program that was established in 1956 added a competing priority to the Army Medical Department. Since 1884, the Army offered healthcare to family dependents on a space-available basis only. The new program, which eventually became the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS), was a new entitlement. The total cost of CHAMPUS to government in its first full year in 1967 was $106 million. 24 This encouraged the Army Medical department to expand its medical capabilities to cover all aspects of medical 7 care across a much wider age spectrum to retain patients within the military system rather than subsidize the cost of care through civilian networks. This became an increasing challenge as fewer medical professionals opted for military careers at the end of the draft which had afforded the Army the ability to absorb the medical care requirements for the wounded from the Vietnam War. The response was to build a robust medical education program that offered residency and fellowship specialty training as a recruiting incentive in exchange for committed periods of military service. This in turn, required a solid patient population base to meet education standards. In
1973, President Nixon issued Executive Order 11733, which essentially reversed
Truman's position such that the Army could choose when it would send wounded patients to the VA for treatment. At that time, Vietnam wounded veterans represented less than 2% of the VA beneficiary population. 25 The Cold War years minimized the attention given to the medical treatment or rehabilitation for war-injured given the lack of any major conflict. The advent of an allvolunteer force led to a significant increase of family member dependents. The outcome was that active-duty Soldiers became the minority among patients treated within the Army medical system. The practice of medicine witnessed a shift in phased care from inpatient to outpatient settings. This added further complexity to the determination of 'optimum hospital care' and 'maximum benefit'. Throughout this period the overwhelming majority of Soldiers processed for disability were for medical ailments and illnesses unrelated to war wounds or injuries. While the Army retained tremendous flexibility to retain and treat disabled Soldiers, little emphasis was needed to develop rehabilitation programs to treat the types of injuries sustained in combat. Not surprisingly then, there was little public attention given to the Army disability process or problems. This changed in 2001 with the onset of combat hostilities in the Middle East.
The increase of war-injured Soldiers, especially those surviving severe wounds, has refocused public attention on the government's responsibility to provide rehabilitation, determine disability, and compensate appropriately. This was recognized early by the then-Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs), William Winkenwerder, who issued a policy memo that stated that the DoD's vision was to improve its relationship with the VA to be "mutually beneficial" to optimize "federal resources and infrastructure" while still "respecting the unique missions" of the DoD and VA medical systems. 26 This was remarkably prescient given that the foundation of disability system, a large post-World War II draft Army of individuals with predominantly manual labor skills, would continue unchanged for another 6 years.
Current System
The primary governing statute for the Physical Disability Evaluation System for medical evaluation upon concern that any medical condition limits their medical fitness. The most common avenue for referral to the MEB is by a medical provider who establishes a medical diagnosis and issues a permanent 'profile', a medical document that limits physical aspects of duty performance. However, current practice allows medical providers to issue temporary 'profiles' limiting physical activities for an entire year to provide for adequate time to treat the medical condition identified. This is consistent with the long-standing policy of achieving 'optimal' recovery to promote retention versus disability separation. This provides more than adequate time for Soldiers to receive a comprehensive medical evaluation and follow-on treatment. It also provides ample latitude to the medical system in terms of time flexibility. Historically, this has led to significant confusion by Soldiers who are unsure whether they are even in the PDES process, and if so, where. The more pressing issue to line Commanders has been the assignment of Soldiers in their units who are on limited profiles for extended periods of time. The current operational requirements with the high pace of deployment cycles to support contingency operations, creates problems in unit readiness, as these Soldiers fill authorized slots and count against overall end strength.
The second key phase of the PDES is the Physical Evaluation Board (PEB) phase. When an MEB determines that a Soldier's medical condition does not meet retention standards, the case will advance to one of three regional PEBs. 29 The MEB will make a recommendation to the PEB with respect to fitness based on the severity and extent of the identified medical condition(s). The PEB will review the entire case with all documentation and first determine whether the Soldier is 'fit for duty'. The caveat at this juncture is that fitness is determined relative to the Soldier's rank and Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). If the Soldier is found fit for duty, the Soldier returns to work and the case does not progress any further. If the Soldier is found unfit for further duty and deemed stable for rating 30 , the PEB must then adjudicate the case and assign a percentage disability. The caveat at this juncture is that the PEB will only rate those conditions that render the Soldier unfit for military duty. Medical conditions that do not affect fitness are disregarded for disability purposes. In general, if the combined disability rating is below 30%, then the Soldier is separated from the service with a single severance compensation amount. There are even some circumstances in which separation will occur without compensation or benefits. If the combined rating is greater than 30%, then the Soldier is medically retired and provided lifelong compensation and benefits. Additionally, the Soldiers retain medical care for themselves and their families as if retirement had been achieved by a 20-year full career. Figure 1 provides a schematic diagram of the entire PDES Process.
Figure 1: Current Army Physical Disability Evaluation System 31
The current system has several key problems. The first is that of confusion in understanding the process, which has been a repeated complaint in surveys over time.
While there is an element of medical complexity that cannot be mitigated, the length of time and amount of documentation required to complete a full disability case has played a significant factor. As demonstrated in Figure 1 , some cases can take as long as 18 months or more to complete. That assumes that there is clarity by all involved through the process and no complications that require resolution. In actuality, the complete process is understood by few, and all too often, problems arise that require as many back steps as forward ones. Nonetheless, the frustration that arises from negotiating the PDES process promotes an impersonal bureaucratic feel to those in the system. More significantly, the Army only rates those conditions that are determined to be physically unfitting for service, compensating for a military career cut short. The VA rates all service-connected and service-aggravated conditions, compensating for loss of earning capacity resulting from disability as compared to employability. Further, the 13 Army's ratings are permanent upon final disposition even if the condition degenerates after separation. Conversely, ratings by the VA may fluctuate, increasing over time if a medical condition worsen. The end result is that the VA disability ratings are almost always higher than those of the Army. This dual adjudication process is confusing to Soldiers, and leaves the impression that the Army 'underrates' disability in order to achieve fiscal savings. 33 While that may not be the intent, it is the outcome.
Demonstration Pilot
The media exposé of deficiencies at Walter Reed Army Medical Center in February 2007 focused public attention on the care provided to Wounded Warriors (WWs), Soldiers wounded or injured in combat. The primary aspect of their care that was criticized was the Physical Disability Evaluation System which was described as complex, confusing, and cumbersome. 34 The Army immediately conducted an inspection by the Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG), which released its report findings in March 2007. That report highlighted 41 observations and findings for corrective action covering the policies, procedures, and practices related to the PDES. 35 Additionally, a formal organizational process review (Lean Six Sigma 36 ) was conducted.
Under the leadership of then-BG Michael Tucker, known as the 'Bureaucracy Buster', the number of required documents and forms, many duplicative, was significantly reduced. 37 Robust efforts were made to provide Soldiers with the necessary information and knowledge with respect to understanding the PDES process. Soldiers were provided with dedicated Case Managers and MEB Physicians that were assigned lower patient ratios to ensure more personalized service. The most significant change was the creation of Warrior Transition Units (WTUs) to which medically impaired Soldiers 14 were assigned. 38 These units were modeled on the traditional Army unit structure with a Commander and complete support staff. The only requirement of the cadre of the WTUs was to support wounded warriors with all their administrative and medical needs.
Co-location of the WTUs with MTFs facilitated the sole mission for the assigned Soldiers, to medically heal. 39 The Senior Oversight Committee (SOC) was created in May 2007 as part of the effort to improve all aspects of military medical care. Co-chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Veterans' Affairs, the goal was to integrate the DoD and VA into a single team that would better support the needs of Wounded, Ill, and Injured (WII) service members. 40 One specific Line of Action (LoA 1) was devoted to making improvements upon the Disability Evaluation System (DES).
Within the framework of the committee guidelines, improvements were restricted to those that could be accomplished without legislative change to existing statutes. Subsequent to a combined service 'Clean Sheet' assessment 41 , the DoD and VA embarked on a Demonstration Pilot project in November 2007. 42 The key improvements were numerous. The most significant change was improved coordination between the two agencies with earlier involvement by the VA. Previously, Soldiers transferred to the VA system only after all service requirements were completed. This often resulted in gaps in medical care and delays in provision of compensation and benefits because of administrative requirements between the two. Earlier involvement by the VA started with a single physical exam performed by VA physicians that would be used by both agencies for the disability evaluation case. Figure 2 highlights the overlap of the two agencies.
Figure 2: DES Demonstration Pilot Overlap
Further, the VA was given the task of determining disability for all identified medical conditions. The Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) also co-located satellite offices with Army MTFs in order to enroll prospective veterans earlier and provide information with regard to compensation and benefits. Among the pilot cases, greater consistency was noted and gaps in care have been eliminated. 43 All of the combined improvements have decreased the confusion, and in that regard, improved satisfaction with the PDES. Nonetheless, these improvements did not address the dualadjudication aspect of disability. While the VA performs the single physical exam, and determines the disability ratings from that exam, the Army is still responsible for using those disability ratings for the unfitting conditions. Hence, the entire Army disability process still exists. Most significantly, Soldiers do not "trust" the process or system. 44 The Army retains the responsibility for initial medical evaluation and treatment of Soldiers that are identified as Wounded, Ill, or Injured (WII). Further, the Army will continue to initiate rehabilitation. Advances in medical technology have shown that despite suffering devastating injuries, Soldiers with the desire to serve have the potential, with appropriate rehabilitation, to return to full duty. 45 Hence, by limiting the Army to adjudication of "fitness for duty," flexibility is provided to the medical treatment team in cases that require extended and intense rehabilitation to achieve 'optimal' recovery. This approach is consistent with the Army Warrior Ethos of never leaving a "Fallen Comrade." Further, it encourages maximal recovery while endorsing retention for continued service. In cases where fitness cannot be achieved, the medical rehabilitation process will have still set the course for medical recovery that emphasizes self-reliance and transition to the civilian sector. In the absence of providing any military disability compensation, the Army could devise a process of equitable compensating for service rendered, based on achieved rank and length of service.
The VA would assume responsibility for the complete adjudication of disability in cases that are 'unfit' with amendment to Title 38, U.S.C. Following the established methodology of determining percentage disability using the VASRD would eliminate the complexity of dual adjudication and with it, the adversarial stance between the Army and disabled Soldiers. Continued early involvement would leverage the cohesive and cooperative spirit that has been created by the demonstration pilot program. The interagent relationship places the focus of importance on the Soldier and limits the risk of administrative and clinical gaps. Most importantly, it creates a seamless transition for Soldiers whether they continue to serve in a military role or convert to a civilian position.
All would remain united in the goal of achieving maximal recovery. Disability compensation and benefits would be equitably provided based on the medical impairment(s) that limit veterans' earning capacity and create loss of quality of life.
The major disadvantage to reforming the PDES will be the need to realign federal funding streams to both the Departments of Defense and Veteran Affairs. It is likely that the DoD will realize a significant cost-avoidance in the absence of providing disability compensation while the VA will assume a corresponding significant cost-liability with the responsibility of all disability compensation. To be clear though, the likely outcome will result in an overall increased tax burden.
Conclusion
The Army Medical Department has a long and rich history that has been an integral supporting part of the Nation's defense. Despite increasing complexity, the mission has been variously described in a succinct manner. Dr. Richard L. Meiling, the then-Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) in 1951, described it as follows.
The basic reason for the existence of the military medical services is to provide support for the men who fight. Other activities, in peace and war, frequently compete for time, talent, and funds: but anything that deflects the medical services from this supporting mission is a liability against the military strength of the Nation. 46 While seemingly straight forward then, the current culture of persistent conflict and its consequences has resulted ina much broader view in defining 'support' to Soldiers.
The AMAP vision for Army medicine, VA and other support agencies is the creation of a sustainable health care system where all injured and ill Soldiers are medically treated, vocationally rehabilitated and returned successfully to active duty, or transitioned back to civilian life with follow-up health care provided by the VA. 47 Today's all-volunteer force requires Americans that choose to embark on a career in a military organization that does, and most likely will continue to, request service in a combat zone. Those that serve in the Army are aware of this, and the inherent risk that combat duty poses. In the face of injury, the Soldiers expectations are straight forward as depicted in Figure 5 .
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Figure 5: Expectations by the Combat Disabled
They desire a medical retirement that validates their service and consequent sacrifice.
They desire the assistance through transition to the civilian sector that avoids any significant income stream loss or gap. They desire healthcare benefits for their Family that were equal to those while they were in the service. Reform of the Disability Evaluation System that severs the Army from adjudication is the first step that can close the existing gaps such that Soldiers' expectations can be met. Anything less, risks the possibility that future generations of Soldiers will not be available or willing to serve the Nation. 
